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FTC v. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY:
THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT REGULATORY POLICY
INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission issued a com-
plaint' against the nation's eight largest petroleum companies alleging
three separate violations of section five of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.2 Complaint counsel's contemplated relief includes the di-
vestiture of 40 percent to 60 percent of respondents' refinery capacity
in the relevant market and some of respondents' pipeline assets.3
Given the vital importance of petroleum products to our society4 and
the recent outpouring of criticism against the petroleum industry, the
FTC's investigation and its subsequent complaint were not entirely
unexpected. 5 However, the comprehensive reach of the remedy prof-
fered by complaint counsel, the restructuring of the petroleum in-
dustry, if successful, presages profound repercussions not only for that
1. Complaint, Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., July 18, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Complaint]. Respondents include Exxon Corporation, Texaco Incorporated, Gulf
Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Standard Oil Company of California, Stand-
ard Oil Company (Indiana), Shell Oil Corporation, and Atlantic Richfield Company.
After filing the complaint, the FTC filed its discovery plans, but only nine depositions
had been taken by late 1974. The FTC has urged appointment of an administrative
law judge for the purpose of completing discovery by all parties no later than October,
1977, and is hoping for a 1978 trial date. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 685, at
A-1 (1974).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970) provides in part: "Unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared
unlawful."
3. See Prediscovery Statement for Complaint Counsel at 137-41, Exxon Corp.,
No. 8934 (F.T.C., July 18, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Prediscovery Statement]. Com-
plaint counsel seeks additional remedial measures including a ban against future re-
finery acquisitions and limits on joint ventures, processing arrangements and crude and
product exchanges. It should be noted that the relief of divestiture was not included
in the complaint, which merely requested that "the Commission [be able to] order such
relief as is necessary or appropriate in order to correct or remedy the effects of anti-
competitive practices.. . ." Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
4. Since 1950, energy consumption in the United States has more than doubled,
with petroleum and natural gas now accounting for approximately 70 percent of our
energy supply. FTC, PRELIMINARY FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON ITS
INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1 (1973) (reprinted by Senate Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT].
5. Id. at V-XI. Brief of Points and Authorities for Exxon Corporation in Sup-
port of Motions to Dismiss at 3-12, Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., July 18, 1973).
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industry, but for the structure and behavior of much of America's
industrial activity.
The request for fundamental structural relief appears to be a re-
action to the FTC's staff evaluation of its prior antitrust litigation:
The history of the Federal Trade Commission's activity in the
petroleum industry has been characterized by a case-by-case attack on
specific anti-competitive marketing practices .... Despite the staff's
success... the petroleum industry over the last 50 years has managed
to circumvent the orders in many cases by subtle changes in policy
or practices.
[T]he practice-by-practice approach to antitrust attack, which
sought to correct specific anti-competitive conduct at the marketing
level, did not adequately address the industry's vertically integrated
structure or its multi-level behavior. . . .To fashion a remedy for
one level without considering the performance of a company, or the
industry, at the other levels, ignores the market power associated with
vertical integration and limited competition.6
In developing a remedy for its present action complaint counsel,
therefore, sought to "carefully choose remedies which will alleviate
its (the industry's) underlying competitive deficiencies." 7
If the elimination of competitive deficiencies is complaint coun-
sel's principal objective,8 the threshhold question which arises is
whether this objective can be achieved through structural reorganiza-
don. While respondents may have contributed to any alleged beha-
vioral or structural competitive deficiencies in the oil industry, there
are persuasive arguments that governmental regulation of the industry
is primarily responsible for engendering and maintaining these under-
lying deficiencies. More importantly, it appears likely that the con-
6. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 4-5.
7. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 137.
8. Since section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act is prophylactic or cor-
rective rather than punitive, particular attention should be given to the probable so-
cial benefits or costs of any contemplated relief. Section 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1970), provides in pertinent part:
(b) Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such
person . .. is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive
act or practice in commerce .. . it shall issue and serve . . .a complaint stat-
ing its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing ....
If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the
method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by sec-
tions 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title, it shall make a report . . . and cause
to be served . . . an order requiring such person . . . to cease and desist from
using such method of competition or such act or practice.
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tinuation of the same governmental policies will preclude any proba-
ble benefits which might otherwise accrue from restructuring the in-
dustry. To paraphrase the FTC's staff evaluation: to fashion a remedy
for the industry, without considering the regulatory context within
which such restructuring must function, is to ignore a fundamental
determinant of market behavior and structure. It is the purpose of
this Comment to explore the interrelationship between complaint
counsel's proposed divestiture and current governmental interference
in the industry's markets. Specifically, the author will attempt to ex-
plain why structural change, without accompanying regulatory
changes, cannot be expected, in the long run, to effectuate ameliorative
structural or behavioral modifications. The industry's present struc-
ture and respondents' alleged violations will first be examined. The
influence of market demand prorationing, import restrictions, and
special tax provisions on the industry's structure and conduct will
then be considered. The Comment will conclude by discussing why
divestiture is not likely to achieve the objectives desired by the FTC,
should existing governmental policies remain constant.
I. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND THE FTC COMPLAINT
On May 31, 1973, Senator Henry Jackson forwarded a letter to
the FTC requesting the preparation of a report on the petroleum in-
dustry." On July 6, 1973, the FTC submitted a preliminary staff re-
port on its investigation of the industry.10 For purposes of its investiga-
tion the FTC divided the petroleum industry into four functionally
distinct levels: crude oil production, refining, marketing, and trans-
portation." While noting that significant numbers of independent
companies operate at each level, the FTC has charged that the industry
is dominated by 18 vertically integrated firms ("majors") that operate
at all levels,'2 the eight largest of which were named in its complaint.
At the crude oil production level there were between 10,000 and
12,000 producers in the United States in 1969, but the top eight ac-
counted for approximately 51 percent of domestic net crude produc-
9. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at V-VIII.
10. Id. at IX.
11. Id. at 12. However, in its prediscovery statement complaint counsel further
separated product transportation and crude oil transportation, making five levels. See
Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
12. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
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tion.13 The FTC, comparing domestic net crude production in 1960,
noted a clear trend toward increasing concentration at this level.14
The refining level, which the FTC views as pivotal to the alleged
anticompetitive structure and behavior of the industry, was composed
of 282 domestic refineries and approximately 129 refining companies
in 1972.15 However, the top eight firms possessed approximately 58
percent of domestic crude oil and gasoline refining capacity in 1970.10
Within the relevant market the respondents accounted for 65 percent
of refining capacity. 7 Perhaps more importantly, the domestic self-
sufficiency rate of the top eight refiners averaged approximately 68 per-
cent in 1969. s Independent refiners enjoyed a self-sufficiency rate of
under 5 percent in 1970, relying for approximately 31 and 17 percent
of their crude needs respectively from the top eight producers and the
ten next largest "majors."' 9
Gasoline marketing was found to be the most competitive level
of the petroleum industry with major branded gasoline stations and
independent stations engaging in significant price competition.20 The
13. Id. at 12-13. The top 4 and 20 oil producing firms accounted respectively
for 31 and 70 percent of domestic crude production. It should be noted that the statistics
used in this Comment often do not correspond precisely to the relevant geographic
market because the FTC's data are either national or divided according to PAD (Pe-
troleum Administration for Defense) districts, while the relevant geographic market
includes PAD districts I & III plus Tennessee. Furthermore, the FTC's data are by
no means incontrovertible. As it admitted in its statement on methodology, data were
received from only some 50 cooperating firms in addition to public and governmental
sources and some federal and state agencies. See id. at 5-6. However, since this Com-
ment is critical of the FTC's proposed divestiture, should governmental regulation of
the industry remain constant, it has accepted the agency's data for purposes of analysis.
14. Id. The top 4, 8, and 20 oil producing companies in 1960 accounted respec-
tively for 26, 43, and 62 percent of domestic net crude production.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id. The top 4 and 20 oil refining companies possessed respectively approxi-
mately 33 and 86 percent of domestic crude oil and gasoline refining capacity.
17. Perdiscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 9.
18. PRELIMsINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 20-21. The self-sufficiency rate
equals the percentage of crude inputs acquired by a refiner from owned production
facilities. World wide self-sufficiency of the top eight refiners averaged over 100 per-
cent in 1969.
19. Id. at 6-7. The low self-sufficiency rate of independent refiners is particularly
significant in periods of short supply, when they are vulnerable to the marketing deci-
sions of the majors who normally provide almost one half of the independents' inputs.
Independent refiners' shortages in turn become the shortages of independent marketers
of gasoline.
20. Id. at 21-23. Independents tend to distinguish their product primarily on a
price basis, while major branded stations tend to engage in product differentiation.
Where consumers show a preference for price differentiation, vigorous price competi-
tion between majors and independents may result.
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top eight marketers of gasoline (respondents) accounted for approxi-
mately 55 percent of the 1970 market share.21 Approximately 75 per-
cent of crude oil and 27 percent of refinery products were trans-
ported by pipelines which are regulated as "common carriers" by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.2 Because of high capital costs
and large economies of scale, the pipeline level is dominated by the
major petroleum companies individually or through joint ventures. 23
In its complaint the FTC has alleged three separate violations of
section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The complaint
charges that respondents' acts and practices:
20. [C]onstitute a combination or agreement to monopolize re-
fining of crude oil into petroleum products in the relevant mar-
kets ....
2... . [M]aintained monopoly power over the refining of crude
oil into petroleum products in the relevant markets ....
3 .... [R]estrained trade and maintained a noncompetitive mar-
ket structure in the refining of crude oil into petroleum products in
the relevant markets .... 24
Complaint counsel construed the first two alleged violations as Sher-
man Act related charges. 25 Noting that a Sherman Act violation is
not prerequisite to proof of a section five violation, 26 complaint coun-
sel nonetheless has used Sherman criteria to structure its arguments.
27
21. Id. The top 4 and 20 gasoline marketing firms controlled respectively 31 and
79 percent of the gasoline market.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id.
24. Complaint, supra note 1, at §§ 20-22.
25. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 96-99; see Sherman Antitrust Act,
§1 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
26. Unfair methods of competition condemned by section five are not confined to
those acts and practices which were unlawful at common law, or that were condemned
by the Sherman or Clayton Acts. Rather, section five was intended to reach, in their
incipiency, acts and practices which, if full blown, would violate those acts. See FTC
v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693
(1948).
27. However, it is unclear whether complaint counsel is arguing a violation of
section one or section two of the Sherman Act. The language of the first alleged viola-
tion, "a combination or agreement to monopolize," might be construed either as a
combination in restraint of trade under section one, or as a combination or conspiracy
to monopolize under section two. The second alleged violation, that respondents "main-
tained monopoly power," appears to fall within the "shall monopolize" language of
section two. Such a violation iWould require proof of monopoly power and the willful
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The third alleged violation is not a Sherman Act related charge, but
is premised on the FTC's power to prevent unfair competitive prac-
tices. For purposes of the complaint, the relevant geographic market
encompasses the Eastern and Gulf states, part of the Mid-Continent
area, and relevant submarkets. 2 The product market is the "refining
of crude oil into petroleum products." 29
Underlying the alleged violations is the FTC's accusation that
the respondents' conduct has been cooperative rather than competi-
tive. In addition to charging specific acts in violation of section five,
the FTC points to an "intricate web of interrelationships" among
the respondents which promotes common rather than competitive
interests: 30 joint ventures in crude oil production and pipeline
transportation of crude,8' common ownership of respondent com-
panies,32 and indirect connections through interrelations with the
financial community.33 The FTC further alleges34 that at the market-
ing level respondents, pursuing a common course of action, have re-
fused to sell gasoline and other refined products to independent mar-
keters, have participated in restrictive or exclusionary exchanges and
sales of gasoline and other refined products, and have entered into
processing arrangements with independent refineries in order to avoid
competition by limiting the availability of refined products to inde-
pendent marketers.35 The FTC also charges that at the crude and
acquisition or maintenance of that power, as opposed to mere economic inevitability.
See United States v. E. I. du Pont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (cellophane
case); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953).
28. The relevant geographic market consists of Petroleum Administration for
Defense (PAD) districts I & III and Tennessee. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3,
at 32.
29. Complaint, supra note 1, at §§ 11-12. The principal submarket is the refined
product, gasoline. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 35.
30. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 3-6.
31. Id. at 23-29.
32. Id. at 5-6. For example, complaint counsel notes that Chase Manhattan Bank
is both the largest shareholder of Atlantic Richfield and the second largest shareholder
of Mobil.
33. Id. at 29-30.
34. Complaint counsel does not specify which of the alleged facts support which of
the alleged section five violations. For the list of allegations, see Complaint, supra note
1, at §§ 15-19; Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 102-07.
35. The FTC alleges that because of the 1973 oil shortage 1,200 gas stations had
closed, due to a lack of product, by May 30, 1973. All but a handful were independents.
PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
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refining levels respondents have participated in restrictive or exclu-
sionary transfers of crude among themselves, have adhered to a sys-
tem of posted prices to maintain an artificially high level of crude
prices, and have accommodated the needs of each other in the trans-
portation of crude through their ownership and control of transport-
ing facilities. The effect of these alleged practices, according to the
FTC, has been to increase barriers to entry by keeping profits at the
refining level artificially low and limiting the supply of crude oil
available to independent refiners and potential entrants3 6 The FTC
charges that respondents' acts and practices have foreclosed actual
and potential competition at all levels of the petroleum industry, have
distorted the normal response of supply and demand for refined prod-
ucts, and have caused profits and returns on investment substantially
in excess of those that would have been earned in a competitively
structured market.37
Even if these allegations are eventually substantiated, it is still
necessary to determine the extent to which state and federal interven-
tion in the market mechanism has encouraged or even compelled non-
competitive industry structure and conduct. This determination is
fundamental to an evaluation of whether such intervention will pre-
clude the otherwise purported competitive advantage of restructur-
ing the petroleum industry. To understand the probable impact gov-
ernmental policies portend for the future, it is helpful first to exam-
ine the influence they have had in the past.
II. GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION IN THE MARKET MECHANISM
A. State Restrictions on the Domestic Production of Crude
In response to high oil prices and shortages at the end of World
War I, the number of wells drilled in the United States increased
from 14,157 in 1915 to 33,911 in 1920. 38 After the East Texas Field
was tapped in 1930 posted prices plummeted to 18 cents a barrel
36. The FTC charges that despite an increase in gasoline consumption of ap-
proximately 60 percent over the past 15 years there has not been one new entrant of
significant size during this period. Id.
37. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 107.
38. M. DE CHAZEAU & A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PE-
TROLEUM INDUSTRY 137 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DE CHAZEA-J].
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in July 1931, as compared to an average 1920 Oklahoma-Kansas posted
price of over $3.00 per barrel.3 9 In response to growing capacity and
depressed prices, the oil producing states began to develop methods of
restricting intrastate production. These state prorationing regulations
were reinforced by congressional passage of the Connally Hot Oil
Act 40 which prohibited interstate commerce in oil and oil products
produced in violation of state law.
Market demand prorationing attempts to limit production in two
fundamental ways.41 First, it prevents any well from producing beyond
its physical "Maximum Efficient Rate" (MER).42 Second, it attempts
to limit future production of crude oil to anticipated market demand
at prevailing prices, and to prorate such production ("allowables") 43
among fields and wells in a manner calculated to preserve equity
among producers and prevent any well from producing beyond its
MER.44 While prorationing has prevented physically wasteful produc-
tion in excess of MER and protected correlative rights of small and
independent owners in an oil reservoir,45 its critics have argued that
this regulatory mechanism has generated higher crude oil prices and
a misallocation of resources.
One of the principal criticisms of market demand prorationing
has been that, by limiting supply to anticipated demand at prevailing
prices, prices are maintained by administrative action, rather than
determined by competitive adjustment to costs. In effect, the system
implements the price and import policies of the large integrated firms
since their price leadership would diminish without the sympathetic
cooperation of the state regulatory commissions. 0 While the number
39. Id. at 138-41.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1970).
41. Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, New Mexico and Kansas, which together ac-
counted for approximately 74 percent of domestic crude production in 1970, use pro-
rationing. Texas alone accounted for approximately 36 percent. PRELIMINARY STAFF
REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
42. "MER" is an engineering-geological determination of the theoretically maxi-
mum rate of flow of crude oil which will not endanger ultimate recovery from the
pool by a too rapid release of underground pressures.
43. "Allowables" represent the number of calendar days of permitted MER pro-
duction per month. Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico and Kansas permitted 100 percent
"allowables" of MER after the 1973 oil shortage. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra
note 4, at 16.
44. See DE CHAZEAU, supra note 38, at 122-23.
45. Id. at 124-25.
46. Id. at 125, 239, 559.
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and direction of price changes fluctuated significantly between 1920
and 1934, after the institution- of more effective prorationing, there
occurred a steady increase in posted crude prices between 1934 and
1957 with only one minor exception.47 To the degree that prices are
artificially supported, a significant redistribution of income from con-
sumers to producers occurs.
More importantly, critics have argued that by viewing conserva-
tion as the prevention of geological waste, society is not assuring an
optimal allocation of its scarce resources over time.48 A number of
commentators have argued that conservation of oil must be viewed
economically: "that manner of recovery and distribution of use over
time which maximizes the present value of oil resources to society,
expected future net proceeds from them being discounted at the pre-
vailing rate of interest."49 In other words, maximizing present net
value of a stream of income flowing over time from the exploitation
of oil is analogous to the planning of an investment, which also in-
volves the balancing of costs against future income. Under such a
perspective physical conservation (the avoidance of physical loss of
potential supply, regardless of cost) does not make economic sense
when added opportunity costs of scarce resources required by a slower
rate of recovery exceed the added present value of the additional oil
to be gained. There must be an economic balancing of future bene-
fits against the present costs to society of a slower rate of use.
Further, by allocating a pro rata share to high cost stripper wells
and limiting production from the more efficient non-stripper wells,
the cost of oil per barrel is increased.r ° Prorationing has also failed
to prevent excessive drilling,51 which results in overcapitalization as
47. Id. at 138, 148-49. As an example of prorationing's response to market
supply, when gasoline stocks were disturbingly high to the industry in late 1956, the
Texas commission limited allowables to nine days in March 1957, and eight days in
April 1957. Id. at 557-58. For a general discussion of the adjustment of allowables in
response to supply, see id. at 146-66.
48. See Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry,
53 Ais. EcoN. REv. 85 (1963); McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an
Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305 (1973).
49. McDonald, supra note 48, at 308-09; see DE CHAZEAU, supra note 38, at
230-56.
50. The average and marginal costs of stripper wells (those wells employing meth-
ods of secondary recovery with reinjection of either water or dry gas into the field)
are much higher than those of nonstrippers. See Davidson, supra note 48, at 88-89.
51. DE CHAZEAU, supra note 38, at 124.
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well as the deletion of original gas and water drives thereby increasing
the costs of secondary recovery. To the extent that additional resources
have been allocated to the production of a supply of crude oil which,
but for prorationing, might have been produced less expensively, a
significant misallocation of resources and lower standard of living have
been generated.
While prorationing has been severely criticized, some type of in-
tervention in the market mechanism at the crude production level
appears desirable. Inherent in limited raw materials are "user costs,"
that is, part of the present cost is the loss of future higher prices.
Over time, therefore, the producer will attempt to push production
to the point where the incremental sacrifice of current net proceeds
equals the incremental discounted value of expected future net
proceeds. However, in oil, a producer's cost may differ substantially
from those of society. Where competing producers draw from the
same pool, the "rule of capture" applies: a producer will tend to bring
to the surface as much crude as quickly as possible since the sacri-
fice of future net proceeds due to the loss of otherwise recoverable oil
is offset by the gain of current net proceeds that stems from cur-
rently producing oil at the expense of neighbors. Without regulation,
producers will tend to produce too rapidly to maximize benefits to
society.52
Another problem arises because the crude oil production industry
is characterized by high fixed costs with variable lifting costs repre-
senting a relatively small percentage of total crude oil costs.U3 Because
of the "rule of capture" and low variable lifting costs, the supply of
oil tends to be inelastic. Since the short run demand for oil is also
relatively inelastic,54 a precipitous price decline may follow a non-
regulated major discovery. Without regulation, the major supply
of crude oil offered to the market may reflect neither the level of
52. In other words, if a producer of a common reservoir cannot be assured that
the oil he is leaving for future sale will remain there, he will tend to increase his
current output, even though this increase will lower the maximum return he might
otherwise realize, were he assured that his neighbors would not increase their current
production at his expense. Since the producer is not earning the maximum return
available over time, it may be concluded that there is a misallocation of the resource
between current and future periods. See generally Davidson, supra note 48, at 94-95;
McDonald, supra note 48, 308-10.
53. DE OHAZEAU, supra note 38, at 66.
54. Id. at 152.
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demand nor the level of costs, but rather the chance of discovery.
This situation may be socially undesirable since it may lead to alter-
nating periods of glut and dearth.55
The most widely propounded alternative to prorationing has
been federally mandated unitization.56 Unitization would be required
where there are separate property interests in the oil to be produced
from a common reservoir. Both the costs of development and pro-
duction, as well as the proceeds, would be shared ratably by the
owners. Single control over a single field would preclude the economic
waste inherent in the "rule of capture," as well as permit economic
self-interest to determine well spacing and secondary recovery.57 Pro-
duction would increase only if the gain in current net proceeds ex-
ceeds the sacrifice of discounted future net proceeds. Profit maximiza-
tion would therefore be more commensurate with maximizing bene-
fits to society. Competitive pressures, with minimal governmental in-
terference, would replace state regulation which has caused a signifi-
cant redistribution of income and misallocation of resources.
B. Federal Restrictions on Foreign Oil Imports
From being a net exporter of crude oil in 1938, the United States
was importing over 15 percent of its crude oil and products consump-
tion by 1959.58 This steady increase of oil imports raised fears of
dependence on foreign sources and threatened domestic producers
who had previously been relatively protected from excess domestic
supply and falling prices by state market demand prorationing.
55. See Davidson, supra note 48, at 95-96.
56. See DE GHAZEAU, supra note 38, at 240; Davidson, supra note 48, at 97-98;
McDonald, supra note 48, at 311-16.
57. The field, by operating as a single unit, would permit the manager to maxi-
mize profits by leaving optimal amounts of oil in the ground for future recovery, without
fear that those supplies would be taken by neighboring producers. Two of the major
problems of mandatory unitization would be the states' probable opposition to the
surrender of authority and possible industry fear of federal control. A more substantive
problem involves the inability to determine precisely the limits of a reservoir and,
consequently, who should or should not become a member of a particular cooperative
group. Further, widespread common ownership interests, coupled with the relative
price inelasticity of demand for crude oil, might encourage restriction of production
and higher prices. However, any tendency toward higher prices and underutilization of
productive capacity seems significantly stronger under market demand prorationing
than unitization. See DE CHAZEAU, supra note 38, at 240-44.
58. J. BuRRows & T. DODIENCICH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES OIL
IMPORT QUOTA 2-5 (1970).
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In 1955, the President was empowered by Congress to authorize
increased restrictions on those imports threatening to impair the na-
tional security.59 In response to rising oil imports and the failure of
the Voluntary Oil Import Program of 1957 to effectively restrict such
imports, President Eisenhower issued a presidential proclamation in
March 1959, imposing mandatory oil import controls.10 After 14
years of mandatory controls, President Nixon amended Proclamation
3279 and provided for the gradual transition from a quota method of
adjusting imports to the suspension of existing tariffs and the imple-
mentation of a system of fees.61
Despite the current absence of mandatory import quotas, the
recent Middle East oil embargo and the high world oil price, which
have seriously affected the United States balance of payments deficit,
have caused President Ford to seek reinstatement of a restrictive oil im-
port policy.62 More importantly, the high price of foreign oil is causing
increased development of new high-cost domestic energy sources. As
the ability of major consuming countries to produce their own in-
59. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, §§ 1-7, 69 Stat. 162. Sec-
tion two of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, ch. 445, §§ 1-3, 68 Stat. 360,
had only prohibited decreases in the duty on an article if such reduction would
threaten domestic production needed for national defense. Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970), permits even broader presidential lati-
tude in determining and dealing with imports which impair national security. The Act
provides in part that the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness shall ad-
vise the President of an article being imported into the United States in such quantities
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. The Presi-
dent may then "take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust
the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not so
threaten to impair the national security." The Act provides that consideration should
be given to domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements as
well as to the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual
domestic industries.
60. Presidential Proclamation 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959), as amended, 3
CFR 31 (1974). It is interesting to note that while the President felt compelled, for
national security reasons, to restrict oil imports, there was no modification of those
special tax provisions (such as percentage depletion) available to foreign operations ofdomestic firms. While restricting imports, and thereby increasing prices, the government
continued to subsidize foreign production.
61. Presidential Proclamation 4210, 38 Fed. Reg. 9645 (1973).
62. On February 1, 1975, President Ford imposed a $1 per barrel levy on im-ported oil in order to cut domestic consumption by increasing prices. The President
has ordered levies totalling $3 per barrel by April 1, 1975, N.Y. Times, Feb.
2, 1975, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 1, col. 3. The United States reported a $3
billion trade deficit for 1974. If world oil prices had been the same as in 1973, there
would have been a $14 billion surplus. Id. at 4, col. 1.
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cremental energy supplies increases, the world oil price will tend to
fall to a level no higher than the cost of energy from those alterna-
tives. Should the world price of oil again fall below United States do-
mestic prices (since the average real extraction cost of foreign oil will
be considerably lower),68 consumer interests are likely to pressure for
access to the cheaper imports, to the disadvantage of high-cost domestic
producers. The prevention of either of two undesirable extremes-
overcapitalization in high-cost energy sources or underprotection of
developing high-cost domestic sources-will probably require con-
tinuing governmental interference in the market mechanism of a
resource that is vital to our national security.64 It therefore remains
pertinent to understand the past consequences of such policies, as
well as what their reinstatement portends for the structure and con-
duct of the petroleum industry.
The Mandatory Oil Import Program had three principal func-
tions: (1) regulating the degree of import restrictions through quota
levels, (2) allocating permitted imports among domestic claimants,
and (3) managing program administration. Under the program, quota
levels of imported petroleum varied both by product and geographic
divisions.0 5 Licenses or "tickets" to import crude and unfinished oils
were allocated to refiners as a percentage of refinery inputs. However,
small refineries could receive a larger than pro rata share of permitted
imports, as could refineries with historically higher percentages of im-
ported inputs.66
63. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 1ST SEss., FISCAL POLICY
AND THE ENERGY CRISIS 30 (Comm. Print 1973).
64. Tussing, Prices, Profits and Protectionism-Energy Issues of the 1970's, in
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
ENERGY POLICY PAPERS 119, 130-34 (Comm. Print 1974).
65. The United States was divided into five administrative districts plus Puerto
Rico. Petroleum imports were classified as (1) crude, (2) unfinished oils, (3) finished
products, and (4) residual fuel oil to be used as fuel. See CABINET TASK FORCE ON
OIL IMPORT CONTROLS, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION 11 117-127 (1970); Comment,
The Mandatory Oil Import Program, 7 TExAs INT. L.J. 373 (1972); 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 343 (1970).
66. The "sliding scale" method of allocation discriminated in favor of smaller
and newer refineries by providing that the greater the volume of inputs the greater
the total allocation but the smaller the allocation as a percentage of total refinery in-
puts. The "historical minimum" method assured that established companies did not
suffer drastic reductions after implementation of the quota, by permitting up to 80
percent of the last allocation received under the Voluntary Oil Import Program of
1957. See Cicchetti & Gillen, The Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program, 13 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 399, 403-04 (1973).
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Proponents of the program argued that permitting larger imports
of cheaper foreign oil would result in lowered United States produc-
tivity and increased dependence on foreign oil sources.1 Opponents
argued that the program had developed discriminatory allocations, 8
and was either an unnecessary or an inefficient method of meeting
national security objectives. In 1970 the Cabinet Task Force on Oil
Import Control issued a report on the relationship of oil imports to
the national security.69 The majority estimated that the "cost" of im-
port restrictions, to consumers and to the nation as a whole, was ap-
proximately $5 billion per year.70
The report recommended a phased transition to a tariff system and
intensive study of the feasibility of developing safeguards for United
States oil security by means other than import controls.1 1 Of course,
the present high world price of foreign oil significantly alters the
relevance of many of the findings of the Cabinet Task Force. How-
ever, as discussed above, those prices may again equal or fall below
domestic prices. Should policy mandate further restrictions on oil im-
ports for national security reasons, those programs which minimize
the social costs of such restrictions and are conducive to promoting
competition within the industry should be favored. As previously im-
plemented, import quotas would therefore still appear to be less de-
sirable than the more flexible tariff system proposed by the Cabinet
Task Force.
67. See 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 343, 347-50 (1970).
68. There were special provisions relating to overland shipments from Mexico
and Canada. There were yearly negotiations between the petrochemical industry and
government officials for direct allocations as a percentage of petrochemical feedstocks.
There were privately negotiated settlements between particular petroleum companies
and the Department of the Interior, permitting increased imports by specific companies
in return for substantial capital investment in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See
Cicchetti & Gillen, supra note 66, at 404-07.
69. CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROLS, THE OIL IMPORT QUES-
TiON (1970). It should be remembered that statutory authority for presidential re-
strictions of oil imports is limited to those articles which threaten to impair the na-
tional security. See note 59 supra.
70. This "cost" was made up of approximately 3.0-3.5 billion dollars per year of
transfer payments from one sector of the economy to another, plus efficiency losses in
production and transportation of about 1.5-2.0 billion dollars per year. See CABINET
TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROLS, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION lf 207-08
(1970).
71. Id. at 1111 432-37. The report suggested investigation of the following security
alternatives: underground and conventional storage; subsidization of shale oil or coal
oil capacity; and development of emergency capacity in Naval Petroleum Reserve No.
four.
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C. Special Tax Provisions Available to the Petroleum Industry
The petroleum industry presently enjoys distinctive tax treat-
ment 2 which is particularly advantageous to the large integrated
firms. The most controversial provision available to the industry is
the percentage depletion allowance.73
The principal distinction between depletion and depreciation is
that total depreciation deductions never exceed the original cost of
the asset. On the other hand, percentage depletion is not related to
the cost of the asset, but permits a producing firm to subtract from
its gross income before taxes an amount equal to 22 percent of total
revenues from the property. It is taken when it exceeds cost depletion,74
but the deduction may not exceed 50 percent of the taxable income
from the property.7 5 Since percentage depletion is not limited to the
original cost of the asset, the cost may be recovered many times over.
Crude oil producers may also depreciate under regular tax meth-
ods, or write off at a cost depletion rate, certain tangible equipment
attached to a well.76 Certain intangible expenses incurred in bringing
a well into production may be either capitalized and depreciated over
the useful life, or deducted currently.7 7 Further, the costs of dry holes
may be expensed, or may becapitalized.78
These special tax provisions permit crude oil producers to ac-
celerate deductions and thereby defer taxes, as well as to enjoy de-
ductions beyond the recovery of costs and thus reduce taxes. Large,
foreign-producing domestic firms have been further benefited by being
72. On February 28, 1975, the House of Representatives voted 248 to 163 to
repeal the oil depletion allowance. The provision was part of a 21.3 billion dollar
antirecession tax cut bill. New York Times, February 28, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 613-14.
74. Cost depletion is a unit-of-production method based on the cost of the prop-
erty. Percentage depletion reduces the remaining basis of cost depletion. When the ad-
justed basis reaches zero, cost depletion ceases.
75. See STAFF OF SENATE CosM,. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D
CONG. 2D SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL TAX TREATiENT OF OIL AND GAS AND
SOME POLIcY ALTERNATIVES 1-4 (Comm. Print 1974).
76. Id. at 3. Such tangible equipment would include pumps and other accessories
attached to the well.
77. Id. at 4. Intangible drilling costs include expenses incurred in bringing a well
into production such as labor, materials, supplies and repairs. Viewed economically,
they are part of the cost of an income producing asset and should be recovered as cost
depletion.
78. Id. Economically, the costs of drilling dry holes are part of the capital cost of
the producing well. Expensing permits a producer to write off a large percentage of the
capital costs in the first year.
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granted a dollar for dollar reduction of United States taxes for "royal-
ties" paid to foreign governments.79
The principal criticism of the distinctive tax treatment enjoyed
by the petroleum industry focuses on percentage depletion. Proponents
of percentage depletion argue that, due to the high risk of crude oil
exploration, percentage depletion eliminates the adverse effects of
the corporate income tax on resource allocation and therefore merely
restores tax neutrality.8 0 However, a majority of commentators argue
that available empirical evidence suggests that percentage depletion is
more than neutralizing. The resulting higher after-tax rates of return
attract to the petroleum industry resources that would have been more
productive in an alternative location.8'
In response to the argument that percentage depletion is a neces-
sary incentive to secure sufficient exploration, critics argue that there
is considerable doubt whether percentage depletion efficiently converts
tax revenue losses into increased domestic capacity to produce crude
oil.8 2 The CONSAD Research Corp. reports estimated that over 40
percent of percentage depletion went to nonoperating interests and
foreign production of domestic firms, and thus had little or no effect
on increasing domestic reserves or producion. Second, since the prob-
ability of successful exploration is low and there is uncertainty about
future market prices, the present value of future depletion deductions
from undiscovered wells is substantially lower than from producing
properties. Percentage depletion, therefore, tends to encourage the
drilling of development wells in known fields more than the explora-
79. Id. at 5-6. If these "royalty" payments were not treated as taxes, they would
be deducted from gross income (instead of credited against United States income
taxes), thereby reducing United States taxes by only 48 cents for each dollar of
"royalty." These amounts may also be included in gross income for the purpose of
computing percentage depletion, whereas, if they were royalty payments, percentage
depletion could not be taken on the foreign governments' shares of gross income.
80. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra
note 75, at 11-20; McDonald, Distinctive Tax Treatment of Income From Oil and
Gas Production, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 97, 106 (1970).
81. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra
note 75, at 17-20; McDonald, supra note 80, at 104-12.
82. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra
note 75, at 25-28; Hearings on S. 45 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 40-44 (1973).
83. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE & HOUSE CoMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, pt. 4, at 2.2
(Comm. Print 1969) (prepared for the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury Dep't).
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tion of virgin territories.8 4 Third, to the extent that the supply of oil
land is relatively inelastic, percentage depletion merely increases the
price of oil lands, redistributing income from the general taxpayer to
oil landowners.
Within the petroleum industry itself, the FTC has charged that
percentage depletion contributes to vertical integration, concentra-
tion, and barriers to entry, particularly at the refinery level.8 5 Firms
seek to integrate backward to utilize percentage depletion, thereby
increasing vertical integration and concentration in the industry.
Vertically integrated firms have incentives to seek higher crude prices
in order to concentrate profits at the crude production level where
percentage depletion is available. To the large, integrated firm the
higher crude prices are merely bookkeeping prices, and the firm may
actually increase its net income after taxes by raising crude prices to
a point where refinery profits are zero.86 Independent refiners, how-
ever, are faced with higher real costs and experience decreased total
profits. Barriers to entry at the refining level are thereby increased
by the ability of the major integrated firms to squeeze the profits of
the nonintegrated refiners.87 In order to enter the market effectively,
a petroleum refiner would have to command sufficient capital and
know-how to participate at all stages of production, a requirement
likely to eliminate most, if not all, potential entrants.
Considering the scarcity of petroleum, there would appear to be
little reason to employ taxes to make oil relatively less expensive than
other goods. The appropriate pricing of petroleum is essential to an
optimal allocation of resources, and any nonmarket allocation of re-
sources which artificially lowers the price of petroleum will tend to
encourage economic waste.88 To the extent that the price system does
not produce sufficient after-tax return to stimulate investment at the
84. See Davidson, The Depletion Allowance Revisited, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J.
1, 6-7 (1970).
85. PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-17, 60-62.
86. Id. at 17. The FTC model assumed a perfectly inelastic demand for crude
oil and refined products, and related refiner profits linearly to crude prices. The
model also assumed a self-sufficiency rate of over 40 percent, a ratio enjoyed by all
respondents.
87. It is unlikely that integrated firms would attempt to squeeze the profits of
independent refiners to the point where the integrated firm would begin to lose their
purchasers of crude.
88. See STAFF OF SENATE CoMMse. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra
note 75, at 24.
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crude producing level (such as for national security requirements), tax
incentives may be desirable. However, percentage depletion and the
expensing of intangibles are not generally credited with promoting
sufficient investment in oil exploration to justify their cost in revenue
losses.89 On the other hand, they have been widely accused of engen-
dering a misallocation of resources and increased concentration and
vertical integration within the petroleum industry.
D. Effect of Governmental Interference in the Market Mechanism
The present structure and conduct of the petroleum industry
is very much the product of state and federal governmental policy.
The distinctive tax advantages available to the indhstry, by increasing
after tax rates of returns, have attracted capital and labor that would
have been more productive in an alternative location. This inflow of
resources should have resulted in expanded output and a decline in
price. However, to insulate the market price from excess supply, state
market demand prorationing has effectively limited domestic supply
to the anticipated market demand at prevailing prices. Import restric-
tions have prevented any external supplies from undermining crude
oil prices.
The net effect of this policy has been high prices and over capitali-
zation in oil exploration and production. Society has thereby suffered
both a serious misallocation of scarce resources and a redistribution of
income away from the general taxpayer and consumer. At the same
time it appears that national security, the only justification for incur-
ring these costs, has not been efficiently served by the prevailing poli-
cies. Not only has state and federal policy directly restricted supply,
but percentage depletion has also encouraged higher crude oil prices
in order to concentrate profits at the crude production level. The
major vertically integrated firms have been presented, by the govern-
ment, with both the means and incentive to squeeze the profits of in-
dependent refiners.
III. VERTICAL DISSOLUTION IN THE REGULATORY CONTEXT
In its contemplated relief complaint counsel proposes that re-
spondents be divested of 40 percent to 60 percent of their refinery
89. Id. at 25-28, 45.
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capacity, and that 10 to 13 new firms be established. To insure that
the new refinery companies will have access to major pipelines, com-
plaint counsel further proposes divestiture of those pipelines typically
owned by the refinery, as well as the transfer to the new companies
of fractional ownership shares in connecting joint venture pipelines.90
Complaint counsel constructed its contemplated relief on the belief
that divestiture will "work to prevent the recurrence of the present
shortage of refinery capacity and ensure that the free enterprise sys-
tem will operate to maintain an adequate economic base for Amer-
ica's future energy needs." 91 Complaint counsel argues that its remedy
will reduce refinery concentration and respondents' alleged monopoly
power. Second, it will reduce entry barriers by giving new firms
access to pipelines on terms equal with respondents,92 and by making
respondents net sellers of crude oil and net buyers of gasoline. Com-
plaint counsel concludes that respondents will then have little incen-
tive to affect independent refiners' profits adversely, permitting satis-
factory returns and entry at both the refining and marketing levels.93
As complaint counsel has argued, the proposed remedy will de-
crease concentration at the refinery level, as well as dilute pipeline
ownership and make respondents net sellers of crude and net pur-
chasers of gasoline. However, the more fundamental question re-
mains: will society tend to benefit from such a restructuring," or will
present federal and state interference in the market mechanism fore-
close any meaningful benefits that might otherwise accrue from re-
structuring the petroleum industry?
Crucial to respondents' alleged control over the refinery level
(and resulting strength at the market level) has been the govern-
90. See Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 137-41. Complaint counsel also
proposes several additional remedial measures, including a ban against future refinery
acquisitions, and limits on joint ventures, processing arrangements and crude oil and
product exchanges.
91. Id. at 141.
92. The FTC argues that, despite regulation by the ICC, pipelines can be em-
ployed as barriers to entry by "(1) requiring shipments of minimum size (2) granting
independents irregular shipping dates, (3) limiting available storage at the pipeline
terminal, (4) imposing unreasonable product standards upon independent customers
of pipelines, and (5) employing other harassing or delaying tactics." PRELImiNARY
STAFF RzPoRT, supra note 4, at 26.
93. Prediscovery Statement, supra note 3, at 139.
94. As has already been argued, since the Federal Trade Commission Act is
prophylactic rather than punitive, societal welfare should be a major, if not the princi-
pal consideration in formulating a remedy. See note 8 supra.
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mentally maintained control of crude supplies. Coupled with per-
centage depletion, which has encouraged integrated firms to increase
after-tax net income by increasing crude prices and concentrating
profits at the crude production level, significant entry barriers have
been established.9 5 One of the purposes of decreasing entry barriers
is to permit excessive profits to attract investment into that industry
in order to increase supply and lower prices until excessive profits
are eliminated. Even if excessive profits are being earned currently
at the refinery level, 96 no resulting increase of refinery products can
occur so long as crude oil supplies are restricted. The inability of
potential entrants to secure sufficient supplies will limit entry,97 and
even if additional investments should enter, without a resulting in-
crease in production, a misallocation of resources will occur. It there-
fore appears that as long as market demand prorationing will be able
to limit the future supply of crude oil produced to anticipated demand
at market price" entry into the refinery level will be limited. If exces-
95. For FTC awareness of institutionally created entry barriers see PRELIMIINARY
STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 25-27.
96. It is not clear whether excessive profits are being earned. In its preliminary
report the FTC stated that:
The petroleum industry, and refining in particular, is also characterized by
high barriers to entry. Without such barriers, excess profits would attract
new firms into the market, increasing the supply, and eliminating the excess
profits,
PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. Referring to respondents, complaint
counsel charges that the "economic rate of return, as distinct from their accounting
rate of return, for refinery operations is above the competitive rate of return." Pre-
discovery Statement, supra note 3, at 91. Yet, complaint counsel also alleges that "[r]e-
spondents have established and maintained artificially high prices of crude oil, resulting
in artificially high profits in crude production and artificially low profits at other levels
of the industry." Id. at 93. The Treasury Department has argued that refinery profits
currently rank rather low compared to all manufacturing corporations. See STAFF OF
THE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., IST SEss., DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY STAFF ANALYSIS OF THE PRELIMINARY FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
STAFF REPORT ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, JULY 2, 1973,
at 30-33 (Comm. Print 1973). The absence of excessive profits would seem consistent
with percentage depletion which would tend to encourage the concentration of profits
at the crude production level at the expense of the refining level. Nor does it appear
likely that partial divestiture at the refining level would tend to shift profits back to
that level so long as percentage depletion encourages higher crude prices and the
supply of crude may be administratively restricted to support such prices.
97. As refineries near capacity operation, sharply declining average costs make
operation below capacity, due to the unavailability of crude, less profitable since out-
put is below the level that would minimize average costs. See PRELIMINARY STAFF RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 26.
98. The FTC acknowledges that the past ability of the major firms to turn to
governmental entities to limit excess supply implies a high probability of future
success. Id.
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sive profits are not being earned at the refinery level,29 significant entry
is also not likely to occur. Nor is deconcentration alone likely to lead
to increased supply or lower prices, as long as supply is limited to an-
ticipated market demand at prevailing prices.
More importantly, even if there is entry into the refining level,
or merely deconcentration of that level by divestiture, it is question-
able whether, in the long run, there will occur permanent and ame-
liorative structural or behavioral modifications. As long as govern-
mental regulatory policies enable and encourage concentration of
profits at the crude levels, the large vertically integrated firms may
still find it advantageous to maintain low bookkeeping profits at the
refining level. Respondents, who are to be divested of only approxi-
mately half their refining capacity, may be able to undersell their
nonintegrated competitors, since the shifting of their profits to the
crude level, and the higher after tax rate of return earned at that
level, may compensate for lower profits at their remaining refineries.
Since complaint counsel only seeks to prohibit acquisitions at the re-
finery level, respondents may be able to regain dominance at that level
through internal expansion. The newly created independent refiners
may therefore also seek to integrate backwards to enjoy the special
tax provisions available at that level. As long as incentives for re-
combination through vertical integration remain, divestiture may even
decrease the number of independents at the crude and marketing
levels by increasing the number of vertically integrated firms. 00
In the short run, independent marketers are likely to benefit most
from complaint counsel's proposed remedy since they will have equal
access, through competitive bidding, to any increased output of gaso-
line that will be available from independent refiners. While this may
permit consumers to choose more low priced gasoline without ameni-
ties, the price of gasoline itself is not likely to vary substantially from
the price supported by controlling the availability of crude oil.
Although industry conduct may have contributed to entry bar-
riers at the refinery level, the most significant and least permeable
barriers have been those erected and maintained by governmental
policies. It follows that prerequisite to any antitrust action which
99. See note 96 supra.
100. Of course, should this structure evolve, while the number bf independent
firms might be reduced, the increased number of vertically integrated firms would in-
crease competitive pressures within the industry.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
seeks an ameliorative restructuring of the petroleum industry is the
restructuring of governmental intervention in the market mechanism.
CONCLUSION
If divestiture is to be pursued meaningfully, Congress should
first, reevaluate the special tax provisions available to the petroleum in-
dustry, particularly percentage depletion.101 If the market price system
is not producing sufficient after tax returns to stimulate investment
in oil production (to meet national security requirements), only
those tax incentives which effectively encourage exploration and pro-
duction (or development of new sources) should be considered. Second,
state market demand prorationing should be reexamined in light of
the significant economic waste it promotes. To the extent that gov-
ernmental intervention in the market is necessary to compensate for
the "rule of capture," unitization appears to be an alternative con-
sonant with both economic conservation and competitive behavior.
Third, restrictions of foreign oil imports are only justified by national
security requirements. The determination of the type and extent of
any restrictions should balance the costs and benefits of alternative
programs. A program which minimizes social costs and maximizes do-
mestic competition, consistent with national security requirements,
should be favored. Over the long run, a system of tariffs appears more
consistent with these objectives than import quotas.
Without meaningful changes in present governmental regulation
of the petroleum industry, it appears unlikely that divestiture will
sufficiently benefit society to justify the considerable costs of litiga-
tion, reorganization, possible diseconomies of scale of vertical dissolu-
tion, and the general uncertainty which will inevitably accompany
so profound an administrative restructuring of a major American
industry.
MARC J. SCHILLER
101. Congress repealed the oil depletion allowance for major producers on March
26, 1975. However, income from the first 2000 barrels a day of production (to be
lowered to 1000 barrels a day by 1980) by producers who have no retail outlets and
no more than one small refinery will still be eligible for the 22 percent allowance (to
be reduced to 15 percent by 1984). The bill also strictly limits the use of foreign tax
credits from foreign oil extraction income and foreign oil-related income. N.Y. Times,
March 27, 1975, at 51, col. 5. This legislation removes an inefficient method of stimu-
lating production as well as one of the major institutional incentives for vertical inte-
gration in the petroleum industry.
